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The equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction may depend on the weight players place 
on other players’ payoffs or, more generally, on some social payoff that depends on 
everyone’s actions. A positive, negative or zero weight represents altruism, spite or 
complete selfishness, respectively. As it turns out, even in a symmetric interaction the 
equilibrium level of social payoff may be lower for a group of altruists than for selfish or 
spiteful groups. In particular, a concern for others’ payoffs may paradoxically lower these 
payoffs. However, this can only be so if the equilibrium strategies involved are unstable. If 
they are stable, the social payoff can only increase or remain unchanged with an increasing 
degree of altruism. In these results, ‘stability’ stands for a general notion of static stability, 
which includes a number of established ones, such as evolutionarily stable strategy, as 
special cases. JEL Classification: C62, C72, D64. 
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1  Introduction 
Altruism and spite represent deviations in opposite directions from complete selfishness, or 
total disregard  to the effect of one’s actions on others’ welfare. A person is altruistic or 
spiteful towards another if he is willing to bear a cost in order to benefit or harm the other 
person, respectively. This paper considers the question of the welfare consequences of such 
preferences. Is social welfare in a group in which everyone is equally altruistic or spiteful 
towards the others necessarily higher or lower, respectively, than in a group in which 
everyone is only concerned with his own good? Unlike much of the related literature (e.g., 
Frank, 1988; Ridley, 1997) this question only involves the consequences of deviations from 
complete selfishness, not their origin or evolution. The common degree of altruism or spite   
is viewed as an exogenous parameter, representing, for example, a shared moral value or 
social attribute. The parameter quantifies the extent to which each individual   internalizes 
social welfare, for example, the ratio between the weight   attaches to the payoff of every 
other individual   and the weight of his own, personal payoff. It thus determines the 
individuals’ preferences over action profiles and in particular their best responses to the 
others’ actions. Comparative statics examines the resulting effect on the actual, material 
payoffs. 
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The propensity for acting altruistically or spitefully may have a biological basis. In particular, 
with family members it may be the result of kin selection. According to Hamilton’s rule 
(Hamilton, 1963, 1964; Frank, 1998), natural selection favors acts that maximize the actor’s 
inclusive fitness, which is his own fitness augmented by   times that of each of the other 
affected individuals, where   is their coefficient of relatedness. This stems from the fact that 
helping a relative assists the propagation of the actor’s own genes; as the coefficient of 
relatedness increases, so does the number of shared genes. The inclusive fitness has the 
functional form described above. The fitness of each individual enters linearly, and the 
weight attached to it, which is the corresponding coefficient of relatedness  , is exogenous, 
specifically, determined by the family tree. Thus, comparative statics analysis might reveal, 
for example, how the expected consequences of a particular interaction involving two or 
more individuals depends on their relatedness, e.g., whether they are full or half-siblings. 
The simple, linear model of interdependent preferences assumed in this paper excludes a 
number of more sophisticated models suggested in the literature (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), which might better predict people’s behavior in certain 
experimental settings. In particular, it does not cover “psychological games” (Geanakoplos et 
al., 1989; Rabin, 1993), where preferences for physical outcomes are affected by a person’s 
beliefs about the other’s actions and discrepancies between these beliefs and the actual 
actions. However, a noteworthy aspect of the theoretical phenomena described in this 
paper is that they are evident already for values of   arbitrarily close to  . This suggests that 
similar phenomena might also be exhibited by more complicated models where a person’s 
utility has a first-order approximation, linear in the individuals’ material payoffs, that is valid 
in the limit of weak altruism or spite (Levine, 1998). In this linear approximation, the 
coefficient   expresses the ratio between the marginal contributions to the person’s utility 
of (i) the material payoff of each of the other individuals and (ii) the person’s own material 
payoff.  
The flip side of the limitations described above is that the simple linear model is readily 
extendible to internalization of any kind of social payoff, be it an index of social welfare, 
which depends only on the personal payoffs, a determinant of social welfare, such as the 
level of some public good, or any other variable that is determined by the individuals’ 
actions. In this general setting, the common altruism coefficient   is the weight everyone 
attaches to the social payoff, and the weight attached to the personal payoffs is      . 
Comparative statics examines the effect of changing preferences, in the form of increasing 
or decreasing  , on the actual level of social payoff.  
As this paper shows, the question of whether altruism has a positive effect on the social 
payoff and spite a negative effect has a simple, affirmative answer only in the case of non-
strategic interactions, in which the optimal action for each individual does not depend on 
the others’ actions. In strategic interactions, or games, altruism and spite do not necessarily 
have the effects one would expect. For example, even in a symmetric two-player game with 
a unique, symmetric equilibrium, the players’ personal payoff at equilibrium may be higher if 
they are both selfish rather than mildly caring, and even higher if they resent one another.  
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Thus, altruism in a strategic interaction may paradoxically result in real, material losses for 
all parties.
1  
A central finding in this paper is that a crucial factor affecting the nature of comparative 
statics is the stability or instability of the strategies involved. In particular, in a symmetric 
setting, continuously increasing the weight that players place on each other’s payoff can 
only increase the payoffs or leave them unchanged if the strategies involved are stable, but 
has the opposite effect if the strategies are definitely unstable (this term is defined below.) 
This finding is akin to Samuelson’s (1983) “correspondence principle”, which maintains that 
conditions for stability often coincide with those under which comparative statics analysis 
leads to what are usually regarded as “normal” conclusions, such as the conclusion that an 
increase in demand for a commodity results in a rise in its equilibrium price (Lindbeck, 1992). 
Since comparative statics considers equilibria in different games, whereas stability is a 
property of equilibrium strategies in a  specific game, the finding that the latter conveys 
information about the former is not all that obvious.
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In the works of Samuelson and others, ‘stability’ refers to dynamic, asymptotic stability. It 
therefore depends on the dynamical system used to model the evolution of the players’ off-
equilibrium behavior. By contrast, in this paper, ‘stability’ means static stability. This 
arguably more fundamental concept only considers the players’ off-equilibrium incentives, 
and does not involve any assumptions about the translation of these incentives into 
concrete changes of actions. One example of a static notion of stability, applicable to 
symmetric       games, is evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS. Another example, 
applicable to symmetric games with a unidimensional set of strategies, is continuously stable 
strategy, or CSS, which is essentially equivalent to the requirement that, at the equilibrium 
point, the graph of the best-response function, or reaction curve, intersects the forty-five 
degree line from above. If the intersection is from below, the symmetric equilibrium strategy 
is definitely unstable. These two examples of static stability are in fact essentially special 
cases of a general notion of static stability, proposed in Milchtaich (2012), which is 
applicable to any symmetric  -player game or population game with a non-discrete strategy 
space. The effects of altruism and spite on the social payoff turn out to be related to this 
general notion of static stability rather than to any special dynamic one.  
The layout of the paper is as follows. The next section defines the modified game, which is 
the tool used in this paper to model internalization of a social payoff. The modified game has 
a single parameter, the altruism coefficient  , which expresses the degree of internalization. 
Section ‎ 3 presents the distinction between local comparative statics, which concern small, 
continuous changes to the altruism coefficient and the corresponding equilibria, and global 
comparative statics, which allow for large, discrete changes. Examples of the former are 
                                                            
1 That altruism may theoretically lead to socially inefficient outcomes in asymmetric two-player 
strategic interactions, even if both individuals are equally altruistic towards each other, has long been 
recognized (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1988; Corts, 2006). That the same is true for symmetric games 
seems to be less well known (but see the remarks in Stark, 1989).  
2 Note that this refers to the stability of the equilibrium, and not to that of altruism itself, e.g., in the 
sense of Bester and Güth (1998).  
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presented, which show that altruism can increase or decrease the social payoff, and the 
effect correlates with the stability or instability of the corresponding equilibrium strategies. 
A general definition of static stability of strategies in symmetric and population games is 
presented in Section ‎ 4. Section ‎ 5 gives a number of results that connect this notion of 
stability with comparative statics, first in a general setting and then for specific classes of 
games such as symmetric       games. It also identifies the special form that static stability 
takes in each of these classes. Section ‎ 6 lays out a comparable analysis for global 
comparative statics. Section ‎ 7 considers both local and global comparative statics in 
asymmetric games. The relation between the static stability notion used here and dynamic 
stability is discussed in Section ‎ 8. This relation bears on the likeliness of “paradoxical” 
comparative statics. In particular, it is shown that stability with respect to the replicator 
dynamics does not prevent altruism from making everyone worse off. The Appendix 
presents a useful connection, which has an implication for comparative statics, between 
static stability in symmetric       games and stability with respect to perturbations of the 
game parameters.  
2  Internalization of Social Payoff 
Individuals in an interacting group may be unified in a desire to maximize some common 
social payoff that is determined by their choice of strategies, may only care about their own 
payoffs, or may give some weight to both goals. If the weights are the same for all 
individuals, each individual   may be viewed as seeking to maximize his modified payoff  
  
    (     )         
where    is  ’s own, personal payoff,   is the social payoff, and       is the altruism 
coefficient (Levine, 1998) or coefficient of effective sympathy (Edgeworth, 1881), which 
quantifies the degree of internalization of the social payoff.
3  
The social payoff   in (1) can in general be any function of the players’ strategies. An 
important special case is when   is expressible as a function of the personal payoffs. This is 
so in particular in the following simple and rather standard model of linearly interdependent 
preferences in a one-shot strategic interaction. The model is less general than, e.g., Levine’s 
(1998) model, in which different individuals can be more or less altruistic and their attitudes 
are reflected in the ways others treat them. Here the players’ preferences are all 
interdependent in the same manner. Specifically, the dependencies are expressible by a 
single parameter      , which specifies the weight that each player   attaches to the payoff 
   of each of the other players   relative to the weight he attaches to his own payoff   . A 
positive   expresses concern for others’ welfare, zero expresses total selfishness, and a 
negative   expresses envy or spite (Morgan et al., 2003). Thus, the expression player   seeks 
to maximize is 
                                                            
3 The upper limit of   means that the weight attached to the personal payoff is nonnegative. In some 
contexts, it may be natural or necessary to limit the altruism coefficient also from below, in particular 
by requiring       . See footnote 12 and Section ‎ 6. 
(1)  
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          ∑  
   
  
Comparison with (1) shows that the social payoff   in this case is the aggregate payoff ∑      .  
In this paper, the altruism coefficient is viewed as exogenously given, for example, a shared 
moral standard. Different values of   represent different groups rather than different kinds 
of individuals within a group, and varying the coefficient corresponds to a cross-group or 
cross-society comparison.
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An example of an interacting group as above is a (human or non-human) family. In the 
biological theory of kin selection, an expression similar to (2) gives the inclusive fitness of an 
individual interacting with relatives. In this case, the altruism coefficient   is the coefficient 
of relatedness between   and  , which is, for example,     for full siblings and      for half-
siblings (Crow and Kimura, 1970). Thus, (2) expresses the inclusive fitness when the 
interaction involves only equally related individuals, e.g., siblings. In small populations, the 
coefficient of relatedness may also take on negative values, which represent less-than-
average relatedness. In this case, the possibility of spiteful behavior arises (Hamilton, 1970). 
The rest of this section concerns the internalization of social payoff in the special case of 
symmetric and population games. The general case of asymmetric games is not studied in 
detail in this paper. However, a partial analysis is presented in Section ‎ 7. 
2.1  Symmetric and population games 
In a symmetric  -player game, all players share the same strategy space   and their payoffs 
are specified by a single function          that is invariant to permutations of its second 
through  th arguments. If one player uses strategy   and the others use        , in any 
order, the first player’s payoff is  (         ). A strategy   is a (symmetric Nash) 
equilibrium strategy in  , with the equilibrium payoff  (       ), if it is a best response to 
itself: for every strategy  , 
 (       )    (       )  
In the context of symmetric games, social payoffs          are assumed symmetric 
functions, that is, invariant to permutations of their   variables. With an altruism coefficient 
     , the modified payoff function is  
     (     )        
If the strategy profile is symmetric, that is, all players use the same strategy, they 
necessarily also receive identical personal and modified payoffs. If in addition the social 
payoff   is the aggregate payoff, then it is simply   times the personal payoff.  
                                                            
4 The evolution and origin of altruism and spite are outside the scope of this paper. The model is not 
an evolutionary one, and it is not suitable for studying the effects that different individuals’ attitudes 
towards others have on their own success. The model and corresponding comparative statics analysis 
may however have relevance for group selection. See Section ‎ 8. 
(2) 
(3) 
(4)  
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A population game, as defined in this paper, is formally a symmetric two-player game such 
that   is a convex set in a (Hausdorff real) linear topological space (for example, the unit 
simplex in a Euclidean space) and  (   ) is continuous in   for all      . However, the 
game is interpreted not as representing an interaction between two specific players but as 
one involving an (effectively) infinite population of individuals who are “playing the field”. 
This means that an individual’s payoff  (   ) depends only on his own strategy   and on 
the population strategy  . The latter may be, for example, the population’s mean strategy 
with respect to some nonatomic measure, which attaches zero weight to each individual. In 
this case, the equilibrium condition,  
 (   )      
   
 (   )  
means that, in a monomorphic population, where everyone plays  , single individuals cannot 
increase their payoff by choosing any other strategy. Alternatively, a population game   may 
describe a dependence of an individual’s payoff on the distribution of strategies in the 
population (Bomze and Pötscher, 1989), with the latter expressed by the population strategy 
 . In this case,   consists of mixed strategies, that is, probability measures on some 
underlying space of allowable actions or (pure) strategies, and  (   ) is linear in   and 
expresses the expected payoff for an individual whose choice of strategy is random with 
distribution  . Provided the space   is rich enough, the equilibrium condition (5) now means 
that the population strategy   is supported in the collection of all best response pure 
strategies. In other words, the (possibly) polymorphic population is in an equilibrium state. 
Since players in a population game are individually insignificant in that they cannot affect the 
population strategy, internalization of a social payoff that only depends on the latter would 
be inconsequential if it meant, literally, consideration for the effect of ones’ choice of 
strategy on the social payoff. However, internalization may change the players’ behavior if it 
means consideration for the marginal effect on the social payoff (Chen and Kempe, 2008). 
To formalize this idea, suppose that the social payoff is given by a continuous function 
    ̂     whose domain   ̂ is the cone of the strategy space  , which consists of all 
elements of the form   , with       and      . Suppose also that   has a directional 
derivative in every direction   ̂     ̂ and that the derivative depends continuously on the 
point   ̂     ̂ at which it is computed. In other words, the differential      ̂      exists, 
where  
  (  ̂   ̂)  
 
  
|
      (   ̂     ̂)  
and    is continuous in the second argument. The modified payoff can then be defined by 
setting  
       
in (4). Note that in the present context the social payoff is  , not  , and that the latter is in 
general not a symmetric function.  
An important example of a social payoff in a population game with a payoff function   (that 
satisfies the required technical conditions) is  ( )    (   ), which represents the 
population’s mean payoff (see Example 4 below). Another example is the production level of 
some public good (see Example 2).  
(5) 
(6)  
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3  Comparative Statics 
An increase or decrease in the altruism coefficient   means a change in the weight players 
attach to the social payoff relative to their personal payoff. This may result in a change of 
equilibrium strategies, and hence also of the social payoff. In the case of a symmetric game 
and a social payoff that is the aggregate payoff, changes in the latter precisely mirror 
changes in the players’ personal payoffs.   
The comparative statics of altruism in a symmetric or population game   may be examined 
either globally or locally. Global comparative statics compare the social payoff at the 
equilibria in the modified and unmodified games,    and  , or more generally, the equilibria 
in    and   , with      . The comparison is global in that it is not restricted to equilibria in 
   that are close to particular equilibria in    or to small changes in the altruism coefficient, 
that is,   close to  . The unrestricted nature of global comparative statics means that 
significant results can be obtained only in some cases. This paper considers such 
comparative statics mainly in the context of two-player games (Section ‎ 6). The paper’s focus 
is on local comparative statics, which concern the way the social payoff at a given 
equilibrium in a given modified game    (or, in the special case      , the unmodified game 
 ) changes when the altruism coefficient continuously increases or decreases from  . For 
this comparison to be meaningful, a continuous function has to exist that assigns to every 
altruism coefficient   close to   an equilibrium in   , which coincides with the given 
equilibrium for      . This effectively rules out games with discrete strategy spaces, since if 
strategies are isolated, such a continuous function is necessarily constant. Assuming that the 
strategy spaces are non-discrete and that a function as above exists,
5 the question is 
whether the social payoff increases or decreases with increasing (or decreasing)  . As the 
following example shows, even in a single game both possibilities may occur.  
Example 1. Symmetric Cournot competition. Firms 1 and 2 produce an identical good at zero 
cost. They simultaneously decide on their respective output levels    and    and face a 
downward sloping, convex demand curve given by the price (or inverse demand) function 
 ( )   [(       )  (       )]
  
   
where             is the total output. The profit of each firm   is its revenue    ( ). The 
social payoff is defined as the total revenue   ( ). Thus, with an altruism coefficient  , firm 
 ’s modified payoff is  
(        ) ( )  
where   is the other firm. If the altruism coefficient   increases from   all the way to  , the 
duopoly effectively becomes a monopoly and the firms’ profits increase. However, this is not 
necessarily so for a small increase in  . For every output level of a firm, there is a unique, 
nonzero output level for its competitor that maximizes the latter’s profit. The same is true 
for the modified payoff, for every   less than about     (see Figure 1a). For   close to  , 
there are precisely two equilibria, which are both symmetric, i.e., the firms’ output levels, 
and hence also their profits, are equal. In one equilibrium, the output level is below  , and in 
                                                            
5 For a sufficient condition for existence in the special case of symmetric       games, see Section ‎ 5.1.  
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the other, it is above  . The first equilibrium output level continuously decreases with 
increasing altruism coefficient, and consequently the profits increase. However, at the 
second equilibrium, increasing altruism has the opposite effects on the output and profit 
(Figure 1b).   
The modified payoffs of two competing firms may conceivably represent real profits for 
owners, e.g., if they own stock in both companies. However, in Example 1 and elsewhere in 
this paper, the modified payoffs are not assumed real entities. The question asked is how 
internalization of the social payoff affects it. The above example shows that the effect may 
go in both directions. The comparative statics seen in this example can be understood by 
examining the geometry of the reaction curve (Figure 1a), which is the graph of the best-
response function. Increasing the altruism coefficient   lowers the curve, since it amplifies 
the negative effect that a firm’s output level, which adversely affects the competitor’s profit, 
has on the firm’s modified payoff. At the lower-output equilibrium, where the upward-
sloping reaction curve is less steep than the forty-five degree line, lowering the curve moves 
the equilibrium point downwards and to the left. Thus, the equilibrium output decreases. At 
the higher-output equilibrium, where the reaction curve is steeper than the forty-five degree 
line, its shift has the opposite effect on the equilibrium output level.  
Significantly, the same geometrical property of the reaction curve also determines whether 
the equilibrium output level is stable. It is stable if the reaction curve is less steep than the 
forty-five degree line and unstable (even definitely unstable, in a sense defined below) if the 
curve is steeper than the line. Thus, stable or definitely unstable equilibrium strategies entail 
“positive” or “negative” local comparative statics, respectively, in the sense of the effect of a 
continuously increasing altruism coefficient on the social payoff. A similar phenomenon 
occurs in the next two examples.  
 
Figure 1. The Cournot duopoly game in Example 1. a. The reaction curve. For every output level for firm 1, the 
unique output level for firm 2 that maximizes the latter’s modified payoff is shown for the altruism coefficient 
         (black curve). The two points, marked by short vertical lines, at which the curve intersects the forty-
five degree line (grey) are the (symmetric) equilibria. The lower-left and upper-right points represent stable 
and unstable equilibrium output levels, respectively. When the altruism coefficient   changes, the two points 
move in opposite directions. b. The equilibrium profits. The firms’ equilibrium profit depends on the altruism 
coefficient  . It also depends on whether the equilibrium output level is stable or unstable. For the former 
(black, upper curve), the profit increases with increasing  , and for the latter (grey, lower curve), it decreases. 
 
b  0.2 
0.1 
E
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
0.01  −0.01 
Altruism coefficient 
0  15  10 
Output of firm 1 
5  0 
O
u
t
p
u
t
 
o
f
 
f
i
r
m
 
2
 
5 
10 
15  a  
9 
Example 2. Public good game. An infinite population of identical players, represented by the 
unit interval [   ], face the decision of what part           of their unit endowment of 
private good they contribute for the production of some public good. The amount of public 
good produced is  ( ), where   is the aggregate contribution, which is the integral of the 
players’ individual contributions (assuming they constitute an integrable function on [   ]) 
and   [   )     is the twice continuously differentiable production function. The payoff 
of a player contributing   is given by 
 (   )    ( )      
Suppose that contribution of public good is socially desirable, that is,       . This means 
that players might have an incentive to contribute if they cared enough about the effect on 
the other players. However, since individual players cannot possibly affect the population 
strategy (that is, the aggregate contribution)  , for a modification of the personal payoff (7) 
to be effective it should involve the marginal product 
  (   )  
 
  
|
      (      )      ( )  
Thus, with an altruism coefficient          , the modified payoff is 
  (   )   (     )( ( )    )       ( )  
Since this expression is linear in the player’s own contribution  , if   ( )           or 
  ( )           then contributing   or  , respectively, is an equilibrium strategy. An 
intermediate value            is an equilibrium strategy if and only if        is a solution of   
  ( )  
 
 
     
Assuming   (  )    , there is in this case a unique solution in a neighborhood of    of an 
equation similar to (10) in which   is replaced by any close altruism coefficient, and the 
relation between the altruism coefficient and the corresponding equilibrium strategy 
satisfies  
   
  
   
 
    (  )
   
Hence,  
 
  
 (  )    
     
    (  )
  
This shows that whether internalization of the (positive) social effect of contribution of 
private good actually results in higher aggregate contribution and level of public good 
depends on whether the production function is concave (      ) or convex (      ) in a 
neighborhood of the equilibrium strategy  . In the former case, internalization has the 
above effect, but in the latter, it paradoxically has the opposite, negative effect on the 
production of public good and hence on social welfare.  
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12)  
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Significantly, concavity or convexity of the production function also determines the effect of 
small changes in the population strategy on the players’ incentives. If, for example, the 
aggregate contribution   slightly increases above the equilibrium level    (which is the 
solution of (10)), then the coefficient of   in (9) becomes negative or positive if   (  ) has 
that sign. In the former case, this creates an incentive for players to cut down their 
contribution of private good, and in the latter, the incentive is to (further) increase it. Thus, 
concavity or convexity of   may be interpreted as entailing stability or instability, 
respectively, of the equilibrium strategy. 
Example 3. Generalized rock–scissors–paper games. A symmetric       game   has the 
following payoff matrix  : 
(
      
      
      
)  
The social payoff   is the aggregate payoff, which is given by the payoff matrix       . For 
            , the modified game    has a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric and 
completely mixed. The corresponding personal payoff (which is half the social payoff) is 
equal to (  (     )      ) (  (     )      ), which is a positive and continuously 
increasing function of   in the above interval. The same is true with   replaced by – , 
except that in this case the equilibrium payoff has the opposite sign and it hence decreases 
with increasing  . Thus, altruism, or internalization of the other player’s payoff, has the 
opposite effect on the player’s personal payoffs in these two games. As in the previous two 
examples, comparative statics align with stability. It can be shown (see Section ‎ 5.1) that with 
the payoff matrix   all the equilibrium strategies involved are evolutionarily stable (ESSs), 
and with – , they are unstable (indeed, definitely evolutionarily unstable; see below).  
As this paper shows, the connection seen in these examples between stability and 
comparative statics is in fact a very general phenomenon. This connection is laid out in 
several steps in the following sections. The first step is presentation of a suitable general 
notion of static stability in symmetric and population games. This notion, introduced in 
Milchtaich (2012), unifies and generalizes several well-established stability notions that are 
specific to particular classes of games, such as evolutionary stability and the geometrical 
criterion for stability used in Example 1.  
4  Stability in Symmetric and Population Games 
Inequality (3) in the equilibrium condition expresses a player’s lack of incentive to be the 
first to move from strategy   to an alternative strategy  . Stability, as defined below, adopts 
a broader perspective: it takes into consideration the incentive to be the  th player to move 
from   to  , for all   between   and  , the number of players in the game. These incentives 
are all given the same weight. Thus, stability requires that, when the players move one-by-
one from   to  , the corresponding changes of payoff are negative on average.  
Definition 1. A strategy   in a symmetric  -player game          is stable, weakly stable 
or definitely unstable if it has a neighborhood where, for every strategy      , the inequality  
(13)  
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∑( (        ⋟    
         
      ⋟  
         
)    (        ⋟    
         
      ⋟  
         
))
 
   
     
a similar weak inequality or the reverse (strict) inequality, respectively, holds.  
Inequality (14) may also be written, more symmetrically, as  
 
 
∑( (      ⋟  
       
      )    (      ⋟  
       
      ))
 
   
     
Stability, as defined here, is a local concept. It refers to neighborhood systems of strategies 
or equivalently to a topology on the strategy space  . The topology may be explicitly 
specified or it may be understood from the context. The latter applies when   may be 
naturally viewed as a subset of a Euclidean space, e.g., a simplex or an interval in the real 
line. In this case, the default topology on   is the relative one, so that proximity between 
strategies is measured by the Euclidean distance between them.  
In some classes of games (see Sections ‎ 5.1 and ‎ 5.3), stability of a strategy automatically 
implies that it is an equilibrium strategy. However, in general, neither of these conditions 
implies the other. The difference is partially due to equilibrium being a global condition: all 
alternative strategies, not only neighboring ones, are considered. However, it persists if 
‘equilibrium’ is replaced by ‘local equilibrium’, with the obvious meaning. A stable 
equilibrium strategy is a strategy that satisfies both conditions. In a symmetric two-player 
game, where (14) can be written as  
 
 
( (   )    (   )    (   )    (   ))      
a strategy   is a stable equilibrium strategy if and only if it has a neighborhood where for 
every       the inequality 
  (   )   (     ) (   )     (   )   (     ) (   ) 
holds for all            . This condition means that   affords a lower expected payoff than 
  against an uncertain strategy that may be   or  , with the former no more likely than the 
latter.  
Stability in population games may be defined by a variant of Definition 1 that replaces the 
number of players using strategy   or   with the size of the subpopulation to which the 
strategy applies,   or       respectively. Correspondingly, the sum in (14) is replaced with 
an integral. 
Definition 2. A strategy   in a population game          is stable, weakly stable or 
definitely unstable if it has a neighborhood where, for every strategy      , the inequality  
∫ ( (       (     ) )    (       (     ) ))  
 
 
     
a similar weak inequality or the reverse (strict) inequality, respectively, holds.  
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17)  
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For some games, Definitions 1 and 2 are both potentially applicable, depending on whether 
the game is viewed as a symmetric or as a population game. An important example of this is 
symmetric       games (Section ‎ 5.1). However, it is not difficult to see that, in this particular 
example (and similar ones; see Milchtaich, 2012), the point of view is immaterial: the two 
definitions are equivalent.  
5  Stability and Local Comparative Statics 
The following theorem is the basic local comparative statics result for symmetric games, for 
which stability is given by Definition 1. Both the definition and the theorem refer to a 
topology on the strategy space  , which has to be the same one. As indicated, in many 
games only one topology is natural or interesting. However, the result holds for any 
topology on  .   
Theorem 1. For a symmetric  -player game          and a social payoff function 
         that are both Borel measurable,
6 and altruism coefficients    and    with 
           , suppose that there is a continuous and finitely-many-to-one
7 function that 
assigns a strategy    to each             such that the function   [     ]     defined by  
 ( )  
 
 
 (          ) 
is absolutely continuous.
8 If, for every            ,    is a stable, weakly stable or definitely 
unstable strategy in the modified game   , then   is strictly increasing, nondecreasing or 
strictly decreasing, respectively. 
Proof. The proof uses the following identity, which holds for all  ,   and strategies   and  :  
(     )
 
 
( (       )    (       ))
  (     )
 
 
∑(  (      ⋟  
       
      )     (      ⋟  
       
      ))
 
   
  (     )
 
 
∑(  (      ⋟  
       
      )     (      ⋟  
       
      ))
 
   
  
For  (       )         (       )  , consider the (Borel) set      [     ] defined by 
  
  {     | |            | |
∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ∣
∑(  (            ⋟            
       
        )     (        ⋟        
       
            ))
 
   
   }  
                                                            
6 Borel measurability of a function means that the inverse image of every open set is a Borel set 
(Rana, 2002, Ex. 7.3.13). Every continuous function is Borel measurable.   
7 A function is finitely-many-to-one if the inverse image of every point is a finite set. 
8 A sufficient condition for absolute continuity is that the function is continuously differentiable. 
(18) 
 (19) 
(20)  
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Suppose that, for every            ,    is a stable strategy in   . Since the function        
is finitely-many-to-one, for every             the inequality         holds for all       in 
some neighborhood of  . Hence, for       sufficiently close to   (including negative  ), 
       (cf. (15)). It follows that the Lebesgue measure of    tends to         as   tends to  . 
The same clearly holds for the set    , hence also for           {     |       }   [     ] 
(which is obtained from     by translation, and thus has the same measure), and therefore 
also for the set  
           (       )  
Therefore, for (Lebesgue-)almost every            , the relation          ⁄  holds for infinitely 
many positive integers  . For each   and   satisfying this relation, the strict inequality in (20) 
holds for         (since          ⁄ ), and a similar inequality holds for          with   
replaced by         (since                  ⁄ ). If   is sufficiently large (specifically, greater 
than   (     )), the two inequalities together imply that 
(       
 
 
)∑(  ( 
   
     
   
  ⋟            
       
        )     (        ⋟        
       
  
   
     
   
 ))
 
   
  (     )∑( 
   
 (        ⋟        
       
  
   
     
   
 )    
   
 ( 
   
     
   
  ⋟            
       
        ))
 
   
     
It follows from (18) and the identity  (19), applied to            ,        and           , 
that the expression on the left-hand side of (21) is equal to  (   )( (       )    ( )). 
Thus, (21) gives   
 (   
 
 
)    ( )  
If   is differentiable at   and (22) holds for infinitely many  ’s, then   ( )    . Since  , 
being an absolutely continuous function, is differentiable almost everywhere in [     ] and 
satisfies  
 ( )    (  )   ∫   ( )  
 
  
              
(Yeh, 2006, Theorem 13.17), this proves that   is nondecreasing. To prove that it is in fact 
strictly increasing it suffices to show that (     ) has no open subinterval where   is 
constant. Any point   lying in such a subinterval satisfies  (       )    ( )     for all large 
enough  , which implies that          ⁄  for all such  . Since it is proved above that the latter 
does not hold for almost all     (     ), this proves that a subinterval as above does not 
exist. 
If, for every            ,    is a weakly stable strategy in   , then the conclusion that   is 
nondecreasing still holds, and the only change required in the above proof is changing the 
strict inequalities in (20), (21) and (22) to weak ones. If each    is definitely unstable, then a 
proof very similar to that above shows that   is strictly decreasing. The only change required 
here is reversing the strict inequalities in (20), (21) and (22).  ∎ 
(21) 
(22)  
14 
If each of the strategies    in Theorem 1 is an equilibrium strategy in the corresponding 
modified game    (which the theorem does not require) and the social payoff   is the 
aggregate payoff, then, by (18),  ( ) gives the players’ personal payoff at the equilibrium of 
the modified game. Thus, in this case, an increase in  ( ) spells (uniform) Pareto 
improvement. Theorem 1 can therefore be interpreted as saying that, under certain 
technical assumptions, stability of the equilibrium strategies guarantees that all players 
benefit from gradually becoming more altruistic, if the change in preferences is 
simultaneous and to the same degree for all players and it affects the equilibrium strategy. If 
the equilibrium strategies are definitely unstable, altruism has the opposite effect on the 
players’ personal payoff.  
Changes in the altruism coefficient may also leave the social payoff unchanged. A trivial 
example of this is when there are no personal payoffs,      . In Theorem 1, ineffective 
change of the altruism coefficient is excluded by the assumption that the assignment of an 
equilibrium strategy    to each   is finitely-many-one-to-one. The assignment is also 
assumed to be continuous, which means that (unlike for global comparative statics; see 
below) two equilibrium strategies can be compared only if they are connected in the 
strategy space by a curve whose points are equilibrium strategies for intermediate values of 
the altruism coefficient. In the case of multiple equilibria, this guarantees that an equilibrium 
in one modified game is compared with the “right”, or corresponding, equilibrium in the 
other game. Even with all of these assumptions, stability or definite instability are not 
necessary conditions for the social payoff to increase or decrease, respectively, with 
increasing altruism. It is shown in Section ‎ 5.1 that, if the equilibrium strategies are neither 
stable nor definitely unstable, both kinds of comparative statics are possible.  
A similar result to Theorem 1 holds for population games, for which the meaning of stability 
is given by Definition 2. The choice of topology is restricted in this case by the definition of 
population game, which requires   to be a (convex) set in a linear topological space such 
that the continuity conditions spelled out in Section ‎ 2.1 hold for the game and the social 
payoff.    
Theorem 2. For a population game             and a social payoff     ̂     such that 
both   and    are Borel measurable, and altruism coefficients    and    with            , 
suppose that there is a continuous and finitely-many-to-one function that assigns a strategy 
   to each             such that the function   [     ]     defined by 
 ( )    (  ) 
is absolutely continuous. If, for every            ,    is a stable, weakly stable or 
definitely unstable strategy in the modified game   , then   is strictly increasing, 
nondecreasing or strictly decreasing, respectively. 
Proof. A key difference between population games and symmetric two-player games is that, 
for the former, stability and instability in    are defined by the sign of the expression 
obtained by substituting    for   in the left-hand side of (17) rather than (16). However, the 
first expression can be given a form similar to the second one, namely,  
(23)  
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(  ̃ (   )     ̃ (   )     ̃ (   )     ̃ (   ))  
by defining the function   ̃  as 
  ̃  (   )    ∫   (       (     ) )  
 
 
    (   )  
This formal similarity means that almost the entire proof of Theorem 1 can be reused. The 
only missing part is a proof of an identity similar to  (19), with   ̃ substituted for   on the 
right-hand side (where      ) and the left-hand side replaced by (     )( ( )    ( )). By 
(24), the above substitution of   ̃ for   gives 
(     )∫ (  (       (     ) )     (       (     ) ))  
 
 
  (     )∫ (  (       (     ) )     (       (     ) ))  
 
 
  
Since      (     )        and a similar equation holds for  , this expression simplifies to  
(     )∫ (  (       (     ) )     (       (     ) ))  
 
 
  
For all          , the integrand in (25) is equal to  
 
  
 (     (     ) ) 
(Milchtaich, 2012, Section 8). Therefore, (25) is equal to (     )( ( )    ( )). ∎ 
When considering particular classes of symmetric and population games, more special 
versions of Theorems 1 and 2 can be obtained by replacing the general stability or definite 
instability condition with a condition that is equivalent to, or at least implies, that property 
in the class under consideration. Unlike Definitions 1 and 2, these “native” notions of 
stability or instability may depend on structures and special properties of the game that are 
not necessarily present in other classes. Some of the better-known classes of games are 
considered in the following subsections. 
5.1  Symmetric       games  
An important class of symmetric two-player games, which may also be viewed as population 
games, is symmetric       games. In these games, both players share a common finite set of 
  actions, and a (mixed) strategy     (          ) specifies the probability    with which a 
player chooses the  th action, for            . The set of all actions   with        is the 
support of  . A strategy is pure or completely mixed, respectively, if its support contains only 
a single action   (in which case the strategy itself may also be denoted by  ) or all   actions. 
The payoff function   in a symmetric       game is bilinear and is hence completely 
specified by the       payoff matrix     ( (   ))
     
 
. With strategies viewed as column 
vectors (and superscript   denoting transpose), 
(24) 
(25)  
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 (   )         
A standard notion of stability in a symmetric       game   is evolutionary stability (Maynard 
Smith, 1982). A strategy   is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) or a neutrally stable 
strategy (NSS) if, for every strategy      , for sufficiently small       the inequality  
 (       (      ) )    (       (      ) ) 
or a similar weak inequality, respectively, holds. A completely mixed equilibrium strategy   is 
definitely evolutionarily unstable (Weissing, 1991) if  (   )    (   ) for all      . As the 
following theorem shows, evolutionary stability and instability are equivalent to the 
corresponding notions in Definitions 1 and 2 (which, as indicated, are equivalent for 
symmetric       games).  
Theorem 3 (Milchtaich, 2012). A strategy in a symmetric       game   is stable or weakly 
stable if and only if it is an ESS or an NSS, respectively. A completely mixed equilibrium 
strategy is definitely unstable if and only if it is definitely evolutionarily unstable.  
A characterization of stability and weak stability in the modified game is obtained from 
Theorem 3 by replacing   with   . Alternatively, stability in    may be expressible directly in 
terms of the unmodified payoffs. Such an expression is given by the following proposition, 
which concerns a positive level of altruism when the social payoff   is the aggregate payoff. 
As it shows, a stable strategy   in the modified game is characterized by the property that it 
affords a higher expected personal payoff than any other strategy close to it for a player 
whose opponent either mimics him and uses whatever (mixed) strategy   he uses, or uses 
strategy  ; the former with probability   and the latter with probability      . This 
characterization is somewhat similar to Myerson et al.’s (1991) notion of  -viscous 
equilibrium. The main difference is that the latter only takes into consideration alternative 
pure strategies. In particular, if   itself is pure, and inequality (26) below holds for every pure 
strategy      , then   is a  -viscous equilibrium for      , but it is not necessarily even an 
equilibrium strategy in   .  
Proposition 1 (Milchtaich, 2006). For a symmetric       game  , a social payoff that is the 
aggregate payoff, and an altruism coefficient          , a strategy   is an ESS or an NSS in 
the modified game    if and only if the inequality 
 (   )    (       (     ) ) 
or a similar weak inequality, respectively, holds for all strategies       in some 
neighborhood of  .  
Theorem 3 and Proposition 1 give the stability condition in Theorem 1 a concrete, special 
meaning. (For another, somewhat simpler, special version of that theorem, see Milchtaich, 
2006.) As indicated (see Section ‎ 3), local comparative statics as in Theorem 1 are meaningful 
only if it is possible to continuously map altruism coefficients to equilibrium strategies in the 
corresponding modified games. As it turns out, for symmetric       games the existence of 
such a mapping is automatically guaranteed by an only slightly stronger stability condition. 
An ESS   is said to be a regular ESS if every action that is a best response to   is in its 
(26)  
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support, in other words, if (   ) is a quasi-strict equilibrium (van Damme, 1991). Proposition 
A.1 in the Appendix immediately gives the following. 
Corollary 1. Let   be a symmetric       game,   a bilinear social payoff (for example, the 
aggregate payoff) and   an altruism coefficient. For every regular ESS    in    there is a 
continuous function that assigns to each altruism coefficient   in a neighborhood of   a 
regular ESS    in the game   , which is moreover the unique equilibrium strategy in    with 
the same support as   . 
As an example of the application of Theorem 1 to symmetric       games, consider the 
game   with the payoff matrix   given by (13). With   that is the aggregate payoff and 
            , the modified game    is a generalized rock–scissors–paper game (that is, its 
payoff matrix has the same sign pattern as in the familiar, simple game). It hence has a 
unique equilibrium, which is symmetric and completely mixed (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 
1998). Straightforward computation shows that the three coordinates of the equilibrium 
strategy    are determined by the altruism coefficient   as non-constant rational functions. 
Replacing   by –  clearly does not change the equilibrium strategy but only reverses the 
sign of the equilibrium payoff. As indicated, this replacement also turns the equilibrium 
personal payoff from an increasing function of   to a decreasing function. This finding is 
accounted for by Theorem 1. The unique equilibrium strategy in a generalized rock–scissors–
paper game with payoff matrix      (   )     
   is evolutionarily stable or definitely 
evolutionarily unstable if and only if (i) the sum                 is positive or negative, 
respectively, for all               and (ii) the three numbers √|   | √|   | √|   | 
correspond to the lengths of the sides of a triangle (Weissing, 1991, Theorem 4.6). The 
condition for stability clearly holds for the game with the payoff matrix (13) and for the 
corresponding modified games, and the condition for definite instability holds when the 
matrix is replaced by its negative. 
Similar examples show that stability or definite instability are not necessary conditions for 
positive or negative comparative statics, respectively.
9 With the payoff matrix   given by  
(
      
      
      
) or (
      
      
      
)  
and with   defined as the aggregate payoff, the modified game    is again a generalized 
rock–scissors–paper game for all             . For the left payoff matrix, at equilibrium the 
personal payoff is equal to ( (     )     ) (  (     )      ), and it is hence determined 
by   as a (positive and) decreasing function. For the right matrix, the corresponding payoff is 
 ( (     )     ) (  (     )      ), and it is hence (negative and) increasing. However, 
since for both matrices               but              , none of the (completely mixed) 
equilibrium strategies involved is stable or definitely unstable.  
                                                            
9 However, these conditions are close to being necessary in the special case of symmetric       
games. See Section ‎ 6.1. 
(27)  
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These examples raise the question of whether, for symmetric       games, with the social 
payoff defined as the aggregate payoff, and with           , the personal (equivalently, 
social) payoff at the completely mixed equilibrium in the modified game is always a 
monotonic (either nondecreasing or nonincreasing) function of the altruism coefficient. For 
      games,       games with a non-singular payoff matrix, and symmetric       games 
that are potential games (see Section ‎ 5.3), it can be shown that the answer is affirmative. 
However, this is not so in general. For example, in the       game   with the (non-singular) 
payoff matrix 
(
       
         
         
         
)   
for which the modified game    has a unique completely mixed equilibrium strategy for 
every          , the personal payoff at equilibrium decreases for               but 
increases for              .  
5.2  Games with a unidimensional strategy space  
In a symmetric two-player game or population game   in which the strategy space is an 
interval in the real line  , stability or instability of an equilibrium strategy, in the sense of 
either Definition 1 or 2, has a simple, familiar meaning. If   is twice continuously 
differentiable, and with the possible exception of certain borderline cases, an equilibrium 
strategy is stable or definitely unstable if, at the (symmetric) equilibrium point, the reaction 
curve intersects the forty-five degree line from above or below, respectively. Stability is also 
essentially equivalent to the notion of continuously stable strategy, or CSS (Eshel and Motro, 
1981; Eshel, 1983).   
Theorem 4 (Milchtaich, 2012). Let   be a symmetric two-player game or population game 
with a strategy space   that is a (finite or infinite) interval in the real line, and   an 
equilibrium strategy lying in the interior of   such that   has continuous second-order 
partial derivatives
10 in a neighborhood of the equilibrium point (   ). If 
    (   )      (   )      
then   is stable and a CSS. If the reverse inequality holds, then   is definitely unstable 
and not a CSS.  
The reaction curve is the collection of all strategy profiles (   ) such that   is a best 
response to  . If (   ) is an interior equilibrium as in Theorem 4, then (the second-order 
maximization condition)    (   )     holds, since   is a best response to itself. If the 
inequality is strict, then (28) can be written as  
 
   (   )
   (   )
     
                                                            
10 Partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts. For example,     is the mixed second-order partial 
derivative of  . 
(28)  
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This inequality or the reverse one, respectively, says that at the equilibrium point the slope 
of the reaction curve is less or greater than the slope of the forty-five degree line (which 
equals  ). The former and the latter, respectively, holds for the low- and the high-output 
equilibria of the modified games in Example 1 (see Figure 1a). Therefore, the comparative 
statics in that example are accounted for by Theorem 1.  
In Example 2, Eq. (9) gives    
      and    
  (   )      ( ). Therefore, the inequality 
obtained by substituting    for   in (28) or the reverse inequality holds if the production 
function   is concave or convex, respectively. This shows that the comparative statics in 
Example 2 are accounted for by Theorem 2.  
The following proposition, while much more special than Theorems 1 and 2, goes beyond 
them by pointing to a direct quantitative connection between comparative statics and an 
expression similar to that on the left-hand side of (28). In particular, in Example 2, in 
conjunction with (11) the proposition gives (12).  
Proposition 2. For a symmetric two-player game or population game   with a strategy space 
  that is an interval (of real numbers), a corresponding social payoff function, and altruism 
coefficients    and    with        , suppose that there is a continuously differentiable 
function that assigns an equilibrium strategy    in the modified game    to each             
such that    lies in the interior of   and both   and   have continuous second-order partial 
derivatives in a neighborhood of (     ). Then, at each point            , 
 
  
  
   (     )(   
  (     )      
  (     )
 
 
)(
   
  
)
 
  
where   is defined by (18) if   is a symmetric two-player game and by (23) if it is a 
population game.  
Proof. Since    is an interior equilibrium strategy in    for every            , it satisfies the 
first-order maximization condition 
  
 (     )      
Since 
  
    (     )           
differentiation of both sides of (30) with respect to   and multiplication by (     )    
   give 
(     )(   (     )      (     ))
   
  
  (     )(   
  (     )      
  (     ))(
   
  
)
 
     
By (30) and (31), the first term in (32) is equal to    (     )       . If   is a symmetric two-
player game, then the social payoff   is by definition symmetric, and therefore the last 
expression is equal to (   )       (     ). If   is a population game, then   is connected 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
(32)  
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with the social payoff   by (6), which by (8) gives  
 (   )      ( )           
This equality implies that    (     )            (  )                  (  ). Therefore, 
for both kinds of games, (32) gives (29).   ∎ 
5.3  Potential games 
A symmetric  -player game          is called an (exact) potential game if it has an (exact) 
potential, which is a symmetric function          such that, whenever a single player 
changes his strategy, the change in the player’s payoff is equal to the change in  . Thus, for 
any       (not necessarily distinct) strategies          , 
 (       )    (       )    (       )    (       )  
The potential   may itself be viewed as a symmetric  -player game, indeed, a doubly 
symmetric one.
11 It follows immediately from (33) that   and   have exactly the same 
equilibrium strategies, stable and weakly stable strategies, and definitely unstable strategies. 
Stability and instability have in this case a strikingly simple characterization, which follows 
immediately from the observation that the sum in (14) is equal to the difference 
 (       )    (       ) divided by  . 
Theorem 5. In a symmetric  -player game with a potential  , a strategy   is stable, weakly 
stable or definitely unstable if and only if it is a strict local maximum point, a local maximum 
point or a strict local minimum point, respectively, of the function      (       ). If 
(       ) is a global maximum point of   itself, then   is in addition an equilibrium 
strategy. 
For population games, which represent interactions involving many players whose individual 
actions have negligible effects on the other players, the definition of potential may be 
naturally adapted by replacing the difference on the left-hand side of (33) with a derivative.  
Definition 3. For a population game         , a continuous function         is a 
potential if for all         and           the following derivative exists and satisfies the 
equality: 
 
  
 (     (     ) )    (       (     ) )    (       (     ) )  
As for symmetric games, stability and instability (here, in the sense of Definition 2) of a 
strategy   in a population game with a potential   is related to   being a local extremum 
point of the potential.  
Theorem 6 (Milchtaich, 2012). In a population game   with a potential  , a strategy   is 
stable, weakly stable or definitely unstable if and only if it is a strict local maximum point of 
 , a local maximum point of   or a strict local minimum point of  , respectively. In the first 
                                                            
11 A symmetric game is doubly symmetric if it has a symmetric payoff function, which means that the 
players’ payoffs are always equal. 
(33)  
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two cases,   is in addition an equilibrium strategy. If the potential   is strictly concave, an 
equilibrium strategy is a strict global maximum point of  , and necessarily the game’s 
unique stable strategy.  
A sufficient condition for a continuous function   to be a potential for a population game   
is that its differential (see Section ‎ 2.1) is equal to  . More precisely, this condition is relevant 
if   is defined on (or is extendable to)   ̂, the cone of the strategy space  .  
Proposition 3 (Milchtaich, 2012). Let          be a population game and     ̂     a 
continuous function (on the cone of the strategy space) such that      ̂      exists, is 
continuous in the second argument and satisfies 
 (   )     (   )           
Then the restriction of   to   is a potential for  . 
Any social payoff   in a symmetric  -player game or social payoff   in a population game is 
(trivially) a potential for some (other) game in the same class, namely, the modified game 
corresponding to      . Thus, complete altruism turns any symmetric or population game 
into a potential game. Theorems 5 and 6 therefore have the following corollary, which 
extends a result of Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988; see also Weibull, 1995, pp. 56–57) 
concerning doubly symmetric games.  
Corollary 2. For any symmetric  -player game   and social payoff  , a strategy   is stable, 
weakly stable or definitely unstable in the modified game    (   ) if and only if it has a 
neighborhood where for every strategy       the inequality 
 (       )    (       )  
a similar weak inequality or the reverse inequality, respectively, holds. The same is true 
for any population game   and social payoff  , except that in this case (where        ) 
(34) is replaced by  
 ( )    ( )  
If   is strictly concave, a strategy is stable in    if and only if it is an equilibrium strategy. 
For population games, Corollary 2 generalizes a well-known result pertaining to nonatomic 
congestion games (Milchtaich, 2004).  
Example 4. Nonatomic congestion game. An infinite population of identical users, modeled 
as the unit interval [   ], shares a finite number   of common resources (for example, road 
segments). The cost of using each resource   (for example, the time it takes to traverse the 
road) depends on the size of the set of its users and it is specified by a continuously 
differentiable and strictly increasing cost function    [   )   [   ). Each user   has to 
choose a subset of resources (for example, a route, comprising several road segments), 
which can be expressed as a binary vector  ( )   (  ( )   ( )     ( )), where    ( )     
or   indicates that resource   is included or is not included in  ’s choice, respectively. The 
vector must belong to a specified finite collection   ̌   {   } , which describes the allowable 
(34)  
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subsets of resources (for example, all routes from town   to town  ). The population 
strategy   is the users’ mean choice:  
    ∫  ( )  
 
 
  
It lies in the convex hull of   ̌  
         ̌       
and it is well-defined if for each   the set {          ∣ ∣    ( )    } is measurable. The 
population strategy   determines the cost of each allowable subset of resources, and more 
generally, the cost of each (mixed) strategy     (          )    . Specifically, the 
negative of the latter, which is the payoff  (   ), is given by 
 (   )    ∑    (  )
 
   
  
A social payoff for the population game          is the mean payoff  , defined by 
 ( )    (   )    ∑    (  )
 
   
  
The modified payoff is given by 
  (   )   (     ) (   )      (   )    ∑   (  (  )         
 (  ))
 
   
  
In particular, setting       means replacing the resources’ costs (the   (  )’s) with the 
corresponding marginal social costs (      (    (  ))). If the latter are all strictly increasing 
functions,   is strictly concave. In this case, it follows from Corollary 2 that the unique 
maximum point in   of the mean payoff   is the unique equilibrium (as well as the unique 
stable) strategy in the game   . 
Corollary 2 may be viewed as a rudimentary comparative statics result. As it shows, every 
stable strategy in the “extreme” modified game   , where the players’ only concern is the 
effect or marginal effect of their choice of strategies on the social payoff, is, in a sense, a 
local maximizer of the social payoff, and every local (and, in particular, global) maximizer is a 
weakly stable strategy in   . (For symmetric       games, ‘strategy’ means mixed strategy. 
A similar assertion does not hold for pure strategies.) This result may be interpreted as 
entailing that complete altruism maximizes social welfare. (For a somewhat similar result, 
see Bernheim and Stark, 1988.) Corollary 2 is however much more limited  than Theorems 1 
and 2. In particular, it says nothing about comparative statics with low levels of altruism, 
indeed, about any modified game    with      .  
The stability conditions in Theorems 1 and 2 take a particularly simple form if the symmetric 
 -player game or population game   is itself a potential game, with a potential   or  , 
respectively. In this case, for any altruism coefficient  , the modified game    is also a  
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potential game, with the potential 
     (     )        or       (     )        
By Theorems 5 and 6, a strategy    in    is stable if and only if it is a strict local 
maximum point of the function       (       ) or of the function   . As   increases, so 
does the weight attached to the social payoff   or   in (35). It is hence not very surprising 
that  ( ), defined by (18) or (23), also increases. Similar intuition applies to weakly stable 
and to definitely unstable strategies. 
In the special case of a symmetric two-player game   that is an       game, it can be shown 
that a necessary and sufficient condition for   to be a potential game is that the (     )  
(     ) matrix defining the quadratic form   in (43) below is symmetric. (The potential itself 
is given by a symmetric       matrix.) This condition holds trivially if      , which proves 
that all symmetric       games are potential games. The following proposition shows that 
for symmetric       potential games, and with the social payoff defined as the aggregate 
payoff, completely mixed equilibrium strategies corresponding to different values of the 
altruism coefficient lie side-by-side along a straight line in the strategy space. In other words, 
the line segment connecting any pair of such strategies consists of equilibrium strategies 
corresponding to intermediate values of the altruism coefficient. Along that line, the players’ 
personal payoff either does not change or changes monotonically (cf. the remarks at the end 
of Section ‎ 5.1).  
Proposition 4. For a symmetric       potential game  , the aggregate payoff as the social 
payoff, and altruism coefficients    and    with                 , define for             
   
     
     
  
and denote the values corresponding to    and    by    and   .
12 If the modified games     
and     have completely mixed equilibrium strategies     and    , respectively, then for 
every             the convex combination  
    
      
       
     
      
       
    
is a completely mixed equilibrium strategy in   . The corresponding personal payoff is given 
by 
 (     )    (       )  
  
      
  
      
  ( (       )    (       ))  
and it is thus determined by   as a monotonic function in the interval [     ].  
                                                            
12 The definition may be viewed as an alternative parameterization of altruism in symmetric two-
player games, for           . It is not difficult to see that, since the social payoff here is twice the 
average payoff  ̅, the modified payoff can be written as a positive multiple of      (     ) ̅. Since in 
the last expression the nonnegative parameter   is the weight attached to the player’s own payoff  , 
it may be called the selfishness coefficient. The coefficient is negatively related to the altruism 
coefficient  : it increases as the latter decreases.  
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38)  
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Proof. The potential game   can be written as 
         ̑  
where   is a potential and  ̑ is a function that is constant in the first argument: for an 
arbitrary, fixed strategy  ,  ̑(   )    ̑(   ) for all strategies   and  . Since the social payoff 
is the aggregate payoff and   is symmetric, for an altruism coefficient   and strategies   
and    
  (   )    (   )     (   )   (     ) (   )    ( ̑(   )    ̑(   ))  
A completely mixed strategy   is an equilibrium strategy in    if and only if the value of 
  (   ) does not depend on the strategy  , which is the case if and only if the function  
    ( )    (   )  
 
     
  ̑(   ) 
is constant. It follows from (36) and (37) after some algebra that  
     ( )  
      
       
       ( )  
      
       
       ( )  
If     and     are equilibrium strategies in the respective modified games, this identity 
proves that the same is true for   . The corresponding personal payoff  (     ) can then 
be computed by replacing    with the expression in (37). After some algebra, this 
substitution gives the expression on the right-hand side of (38) plus a third term that can be 
written as  
(      )(      )
(       )(       )  (  (      )(   (       )      (       ))
    (      )(   (       )      (       )))  
Since     and     are completely mixed equilibrium strategies, the last expression is equal to 
zero.  ∎ 
6  Global Comparative Statics 
Global comparative statics differ from local comparative statics in not being limited to 
continuous changes in the altruism coefficient or in the corresponding strategies. This makes 
the analysis applicable also to games with finite strategy spaces, which is not the case for 
local comparative statics (see Section ‎ 3). Formally, the topology on the strategy space   is 
put out of the way, so to speak, by taking it to be the trivial topology: the only neighborhood 
of any strategy is the entire space. Stability, weak stability or definite instability of a strategy 
with respect to this topology automatically implies the same with respect to any other 
topology on  , and is referred to as global stability, weak stability or definitely instability, 
respectively. The previous sections demonstrate a strong association between stability and 
positive local comparative statics. As might be expected, a similar association exists between 
global stability and positive global comparative statics.   
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Theorem 7. For a symmetric two-player game  , a social payoff  , and altruism coefficients 
  and   with          , if two distinct strategies    and    are globally stable in    and   , 
respectively, then 
 (     )    (     )  
If the strategies are globally weakly stable, then 
 (     )    (     )  
If they are globally definitely unstable, then 
 (     )    (     )  
Proof. The proof uses the following identity, which holds for all ( ,   and)   and  : 
(     )( (   )    (   ))   (     )(  (   )     (   )     (   )     (   ))
  (     )(  (   )     (   )     (   )     (   ))  
For        and       , the right-hand side is negative, nonpositive or positive if these 
strategies are globally stable, globally weakly stable or globally definitely unstable, 
respectively, in the corresponding modified games.  ∎ 
Global stability or weak stability holds automatically for all equilibrium strategies in every 
symmetric two-player game that satisfies the corresponding condition in the following 
proposition. Since there can obviously be at most one globally stable strategy, in the former 
case the game also has at most one equilibrium strategy. 
Proposition 5. If a symmetric two-player game   satisfies the symmetric substitutability 
condition that, for every pair of distinct strategies   and  ,  
 (   )    (   )    (   )    (   )  
then every equilibrium strategy in   is globally stable. If   satisfies the weak symmetric 
substitutability condition, in which the strict inequality (42) is replaced by a weak one, then 
every equilibrium strategy in   is globally weakly stable. 
Proof. An equilibrium strategy   by definition satisfies the two-player version of (3) for every 
strategy  . That inequality and (42) or its weak version together imply (16) or its weak 
version, respectively.  ∎ 
The term symmetric substitutability (Bergstrom, 1995) reflects the following interpretation 
of (42): switching from strategy   to strategy   increases a player’s payoff less (or decreases 
it more) if the opponent uses   than if he uses  . An alternative, related interpretation of 
the symmetric substitutability condition is that coordination decreases the players’ payoffs. 
This interpretation is based on the fact that the difference between the left- and right-hand 
sides of (42) is equal to four times the difference between (i) each player’s expected payoff if 
the two players jointly randomize 50–50 between   and  , and so always choose the same 
strategy, and (ii) the expected payoff if the players independently randomize 50–50 between 
  and  . More generally, suppose that for some finite list of distinct strategies         both 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42)  
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players use each strategy    with the same (marginal) probability        (with ∑         ). 
Then, the difference between each player’s expected payoff if the strategy choices of the 
two players are perfectly correlated and the expected payoff if the choices are independent 
is given by ∑     ( (     )    (     )    (     )    (     ))     . A sufficient condition 
for this expression to be negative or nonpositive is that (42) or its weak version, respectively, 
holds whenever      .  
When applied to the modified game, Proposition 5 shows that a sufficient condition for 
global stability of an equilibrium strategy in    is that this game satisfies the symmetric 
substitutability condition. Clearly, if the set of all   values for which this condition holds is 
not empty, then it is a (finite or infinite) interval. In the special case where   is the aggregate 
payoff, the symmetric substitutability condition holds for       (that is, for the unmodified 
game) if and only if it holds for all           . This is because the inequality obtained from 
(42) by replacing   with    is equivalent to that obtained by multiplying both sides by      .  
6.1  Symmetric       games 
One class of symmetric two-player games for which Theorem 7 can be given a more 
concrete form is symmetric       games.  
Definition 4. For a symmetric       game  , altruism globally increases payoffs, globally 
weakly increases payoffs or globally decreases payoffs for completely mixed equilibria if, 
with the social payoff   defined as the aggregate payoff, for every pair of altruism 
coefficients   and   with                and distinct equilibrium strategies    and    in    
and   , (39) holds, (40) holds, or (41) holds provided    and    are completely mixed, 
respectively.  
Proposition 6. For a symmetric       game  , consider the quadratic form            
defined by
  (            )   ∑ ( (   )    (   )    (   )    (   ))    
   
     
   
1.  If   is negative definite, then altruism globally increases payoffs, and for every 
          , the modified game    has a unique equilibrium strategy, which is globally 
stable (hence, an ESS).  
2.  If   is negative semidefinite, then altruism globally weakly increases payoffs, and for 
every           , every equilibrium strategy in    is globally weakly stable (hence, an 
NSS).  
3.  If   is positive definite, then altruism globally decreases payoffs for completely mixed 
equilibria, and for every           , the modified game    has at most one completely 
mixed equilibrium strategy, which is definitely (evolutionarily) unstable.   
Proof. For (mixed) strategies     (          ) and     (          ), the difference 
between the left- and right-hand sides of (42) is equal to ∑  (   )    
 
      , where 
            . This sum is equal to that in (43), since ∑   
 
       . Therefore, Assertions 1 and 
2 follow from Theorem 7, Proposition 5, the comment that immediately precedes this 
subsection and the fact that every symmetric       game has a symmetric equilibrium. If   
(43)  
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is positive definite, then    is negative definite, and therefore the conclusion in Assertion 1 
holds for the game   . It only remains to note that    and   share the same completely 
mixed equilibrium strategies, and that stability of a strategy in the former is equivalent to 
definite instability in the latter.  ∎ 
The quadratic form   defined by (43) is particularly simple if      . In this case,   is 
negative definite, negative semidefinite or positive definite if and only if  (   )    (   )  
 (   )    (   ) is negative, nonpositive or positive, respectively. The last expression is the 
difference between the sum of the two diagonal entries of the payoff matrix and the sum of 
the two off-diagonal entries. A negative or positive difference expresses strategic 
substitutability or complementarity, respectively (Bulow et al., 1985), in the sense that the 
profitability of switching from one pure strategy   to the other   decreases or increases, 
respectively, as the probability that the other player uses   increases (cf. (42)). Symmetric 
      games with strategic substitutability include Chicken and the battle-of-the-sexes 
game, in its symmetric form. By Proposition 6, in such games a higher altruism coefficient 
entails a weakly higher personal payoff at (the symmetric) equilibrium. By contrast, in games 
with strategic complementarity, if the equilibria are completely mixed, the personal payoff 
can only decrease or remain unchanged when   increases. In the prisoner’s dilemma, both 
strategic substitutability and complementarity are possible, and in addition there is a 
borderline case in which the personal equilibrium payoff abruptly increases at some critical   
(Milchtaich, 2006, Fig. 2).  
6.2  Games with a unidimensional strategy space  
In a symmetric two-player game   with a unidimensional strategy space, a sufficient 
condition for symmetric substitutability is that   is strictly submodular, that is,  
 (    )    (    )    (    )    (    ) 
whenever       and        . A sufficient condition for weak symmetric substitutability 
is that   is submodular, that is, satisfies a similar condition with the strict inequality in (44) 
replaced by a weak one. If the strategy space is a (finite or infinite) interval and   has 
continuous second-order partial derivatives, submodularity is equivalent to         
(everywhere) and a sufficient condition for strict submodularity is         (everywhere). 
Thus, if the latter condition holds, and   is the aggregate payoff, then it follows from 
Proposition 5 that, for every altruism coefficient           , an equilibrium strategy   in 
the modified game    is necessarily globally stable. This result may be viewed as a limited 
global version of Theorem 4. Note, however, that for an equilibrium strategy   in   the 
inequality    (   )     (and, a fortiori, the requirement that         everywhere) is a 
stronger condition than (28) .  
In the special case of a symmetric Cournot duopoly game (see Example 1), symmetric 
substitutability is also implied by a simpler and somewhat weaker condition than strict 
submodularity. In such a game, the profit  (   ) of a producer with output level   
competing against an identical producer with output level   is   (     )    ( ), where   is 
the price (or inverse demand) function and   is the cost function. Therefore, (42) can be 
written as 
(44)  
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(   (  )      (  ))   (     ) (     )  
(Note that the inequality does not involve  . This is because the production cost is a function 
of the firm’s own output only.) A sufficient (and, if the price function is continuous, also 
necessary) condition for (45) to hold for every pair of distinct points   and   in the (finite or 
infinite) interval of possible output levels is that the total revenue is a strictly concave 
function of the total output. Similarly, if the total revenue is concave, the weak-inequality 
version of (42) always holds. It then follows from Proposition 5 and Theorem 7 that negative 
comparative statics (exemplified by the lower curve in Figure 1b) cannot occur, so that 
moving from duopoly towards (not necessarily all the way to) effective monopoly cannot 
decrease the firms’ profits. This proves the following.  
Corollary 3. In a symmetric Cournot duopoly game, each of the following two conditions, the 
latter being weaker than the former, implies that altruism (         ) and spite (        
 ) can only increase or decrease, respectively, the firms’ equilibrium profit or leave it 
unchanged, relative to the case in which each firm is only concerned with its own profit 
(     ): 
(i)  A firm’s profit is given by a submodular function of the two firms’ output levels. 
(ii)  The total revenue is a concave function of the total output. 
It is instructive to compare Corollary 3 with the results of Koçkesen et al. (2000). These 
authors show that, in a symmetric Cournot duopoly game that is strictly submodular, a firm 
with negatively interdependent preferences obtains a strictly higher profit than does a 
competitor with independent preferences in any equilibrium. The difference between the 
two firms’ preferences is that the latter is only concerned with its own profit while the 
former also seeks a high ratio   between its own and the average profit. Complete 
selfishness,      , corresponds to independent preferences, whereas weak spite, i.e., 
negative   close to  , gives negatively interdependent preferences if the ratio   is not too 
close to zero. Thus, with a strictly submodular profit, if only one firm is spiteful, it is likely to 
do better than its competitor does. However, by Corollary 3, if both firms have such 
preferences, they do not have higher profits than two firms with independent preferences.  
The result that mutual spite cannot be beneficial does not necessarily hold when the 
conditions in Corollary 3 are not met. As Figure 1b shows, in Example 1, where the total 
revenue is not concave (since it tends to zero when the total output increases), duopolists 
stuck at the inefficient (high-output, low-profit) equilibrium would actually benefit from a 
low level of mutual spite. The reason, as indicated, is that spite encourages increased 
production by emphasizing its negative effect on the competitor, and thus raises the 
reaction curve. Since at the inefficient, unstable equilibrium the slope of the reaction curve 
is greater than   (see Figure 1a), the result is actually lower equilibrium outputs and 
consequently a higher profit.  
(45)  
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7  Asymmetric Games 
An asymmetric game differs from a symmetric one in that each of the players   has his own 
strategy space    and payoff function   . Correspondingly, for an asymmetric  -player game 
    (          )                     , a social payoff function is any (rather than 
necessarily symmetric) function                      . For an altruism coefficient    
 , the modified game      (  
    
      
  )                       is defined by (1).  
A complete analysis of comparative statics in asymmetric  -player games is not yet 
attainable. This is mainly because of the unavailability of a suitable notion of (static) stability, 
which in the asymmetric context is a property of strategy profiles rather than strategies. A 
partial workaround is to view strategy profiles as strategies in another, symmetric  -player 
game, namely, the game obtained by symmetrizing the asymmetric one. In that game, the 
players’ roles are not fixed: all    assignments of players to roles in the asymmetric game 
are possible. A player’s payoff is defined as the average of his payoff over the set   of all 
assignments. Each assignment       is a permutation of (       ):  ( ) is the player 
assigned to role   (         ). A strategy for a player in the symmetric game is a strategy 
profile     (          ) in the asymmetric game: it specifies the strategy    the player 
would use in each role  . A more formal definition follows.  
Definition 5. Symmetrization of an asymmetric  -player game     (          )     
                gives the symmetric  -player game          in which the strategy 
space   is the product space                 and, for all      (  
    
      
 )     
(  
    
      
 )        (  
    
      
 )    ,
13 
 (          )  
 
  
∑     ( )(  
 ( )    
 ( )      
 ( ) )
   
  
Any choice of topologies for the strategy spaces            specifies a topology for  , 
namely, the product topology.  
Symmetrization in a sense preserves the original game’s equilibria. It is not difficult to see 
that a strategy profile in an asymmetric  -player game   is an equilibrium if and only if it is a 
(symmetric) equilibrium strategy in the symmetric game   obtained by symmetrizing  . In 
this case, the equilibrium payoff in   equals the players’ average equilibrium payoff in  .  
The following theorem links local comparative statics in an asymmetric game with stability in 
the symmetric game obtained from it by symmetrization. The theorem holds for any choice 
of topologies for the players’ strategy spaces in the asymmetric game; stability and 
instability in the corresponding symmetric game are with respect to the product topology.  
Theorem 8. For an asymmetric  -player game                        and a social 
payoff function                       that are both Borel measurable, and altruism 
coefficients    and    with            , suppose that there is a continuous and finitely-many-
to-one function that assigns a strategy profile    to each              such that the function 
                                                            
13 Note that superscripts here index strategies in the symmetric game while subscripts refer to roles in 
the asymmetric one.  
(46)  
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  [     ]     defined by 
 ( )    (  ) 
is absolutely continuous. If, for every            ,    is stable, weakly stable or 
definitely unstable as a strategy in the game obtained from the modified game    by 
symmetrization, then   is strictly decreasing, nonincreasing or strictly increasing, 
respectively. 
Proof. The modified game    is a linear combination of two games,   and a game in which all 
players have the (same) payoff function  . Symmetrizing the latter gives a doubly symmetric 
game with a payoff function  ̅, which may be viewed as a social payoff for the game   
obtained by symmetrizing  . It is easy to see that both  ̅ and   are Borel measurable. 
Eq. (46) shows symmetrization to be a linear operator. Therefore, the game obtained by 
symmetrizing    is (     )      ̅, and it thus coincides with the modified game   .
14 If, for 
every            ,    is a stable, weakly stable or definitely unstable strategy in    and the 
function      ̅(          ) is absolutely continuous, then by Theorem 1 this function is 
strictly increasing, nondecreasing or strictly decreasing, respectively. It only remains to note 
that, by Definition 5,  ̅(       )    ( ) for all strategy profiles   in  .   ∎ 
Theorem 8 is applicable both to asymmetric games and to asymmetric equilibria in 
symmetric games. The symmetric games need simply be viewed as (a special kind of) 
asymmetric games. However, the theorem does not give Theorem 1 as a special case. This is 
because the stability, weak stability and definite instability conditions in Theorem 8 are in a 
sense much more stringent than the corresponding conditions in Theorem 1. If a symmetric 
game   is viewed as an asymmetric game  , then symmetrization of the latter gives a 
second symmetric game  ̅, in which each strategy     (          ) is a strategy profile in 
  and vice versa. If the strategy profile is symmetric, that is,                 , then 
stability of    in   is not a sufficient condition (but it is a necessary one) for stability of   in 
 ̅. For example, if   is a symmetric       game,   may be stable in  ̅ (which, parenthetically, 
is not an       game, for any  ) only if    is a pure strategy. 
The last result holds more generally. For any bimatrix game  , a strategy profile   is a stable 
strategy in the game obtained from   by symmetrization if and only if it is a strict equilibrium 
in   (Selten, 1980). Since strict equilibria are pure, and there are only finitely many pure 
strategy profiles, for bimatrix games (and similar games with more than two players) 
Theorem 8 is inapplicable: the stability condition is inconsistent with the finitely-many-to-
one condition.  
One class of asymmetric games to which Theorem 8 is applicable is games with 
unidimensional strategy spaces. The differential condition for stability of equilibrium in these 
games is given by the following proposition, whose proof is omitted.  
Proposition 7. Let     (          )                      be an asymmetric  -player 
game in which the players’ strategy spaces are subsets of the real line, and    
                                                            
14 Thus, in a sense, the operations of modifying a game and symmetrization commute. 
(47)  
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(          ) an equilibrium lying in the interior of                 with a neighborhood 
where            have continuous second-order derivatives. A sufficient condition for 
stability or definite instability of   as a strategy in the game obtained from   by 
symmetrization is that, at the point  , the Jacobian matrix of the marginal payoffs, 
    (
(  )     (  )  
     
(  )     (  )   
)  
is negative definite or positive definite,
15 respectively. A necessary condition for weak 
stability is that the matrix is negative semidefinite.  
Theorem 8 and Proposition 7 together point to a connection between local comparative 
statics in games with unidimensional strategy spaces and properties of the matrix    
obtained from (48) by replacing   with the modified game   . An essentially stronger, 
quantitative connection between that matrix and comparative statics is given by the 
following proposition, whose proof is rather similar to that of Proposition 2. 
Proposition 8. For an asymmetric  -player game     (          )                  
   with strategy spaces that are subsets of the real line, a social payoff function  , and 
altruism coefficients    and    with        , suppose that there is a continuously 
differentiable function that assigns an equilibrium    in the modified game    to each 
            such that    lies in the interior of                 and has a neighborhood 
where            and   have continuous second-order partial derivatives. Then, at each 
point            ,  
 
  
  
   (     )(
   
  
)
 
   (
   
  
)  
where   is defined by (47) and the matrix    is evaluated at   . 
 
7.1  Global comparative statics in asymmetric games  
Global comparative statics are less relevant for asymmetric games than for symmetric ones. 
This is because a condition analogous to (even) weak symmetric substitutability does not 
hold for most asymmetric two-player games. A notable exception is games in which such a 
condition holds as equality:  
  (     )     (     )     (     )     (     ) for all             and          
Games satisfying this condition are non-strategic in that the change in the payoff of a 
player switching strategies (from    to    in the case of player 1 or from    to    in the case 
of player 2) is independent of the opponent’s strategy. It is easy to see that, for any social 
payoff   and altruism coefficient  , if (49) holds and a similar condition holds with    
                                                            
15 By definition,   is negative or positive definite if the symmetric matrix (   )(      ) has the 
same property. Negative definiteness implies that   is D-stable (but not conversely). The latter is 
often taken to be the criterion of stability in dynamic contexts (e.g., Dixit, 1986). 
(48) 
     
(49)  
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replaced by  , then the same is true with   replaced by   . If   is the aggregate payoff 
       , then the second condition is clearly redundant: if (49) holds, then a similar 
condition automatically holds for the modified game   , for any altruism coefficient  .  
It is not difficult to show that, if an asymmetric game     (     ) satisfies (49), then every 
equilibrium in   is a weakly stable strategy in the game obtained by symmetrizing  . The 
following proposition shows that, in such a game  , altruism can only positively affect the 
social payoff or leave it unchanged. 
Proposition 9. Let     (     )              be an asymmetric two-player game,   a social 
payoff, and   and   altruism coefficients with          . If a condition similar to (49) holds 
for both modified games    and   , then for any pair of corresponding equilibria     
(  
    
 ) and      (  
    
 )  
 (  )    (  )  
Proof. The proof uses the following identity, which holds for all ( ,   and) strategy profiles   
and  : 
 (     )( (     )    (     ))
   (     )(  
 (     )     
 (     ))    (     )(  
 (     )     
 (     ))
   (     )(  
 (     )     
 (     ))    (     )(  
 (     )     
 (     ))
  (     )(  
 (     )     
 (     )     
 (     )     
 (     ))
  (     )(  
 (     )     
 (     )     
 (     )     
 (     ))
  (     )(  
 (     )     
 (     )     
 (     )     
 (     ))
  (     )(  
 (     )     
 (     )     
 (     )     
 (     ))  
For the equilibria        and       , the first four terms on the right-hand side are 
nonpositive. If the assumption concerning (49) holds, then the last four terms are equal to 
zero, so that the right-hand side is nonpositive.  ∎  
A simple example illustrating the last result is non-strategic altruism, which is of 
considerable importance to the theory of kin selection (for references, see Milchtaich, 2006). 
An altruistic act confers a benefit   on the recipient at a cost   to the actor, with          . 
Therefore, with   that is the aggregate payoff, the act changes the actor’s modified payoff 
by        . If the altruism coefficient   is greater than    , this means that the actor’s 
payoff in the modified game is maximized by acting altruistically. Increasing the altruism 
coefficient can therefore only increase the aggregate payoff of leave it unchanged.  
An increase in the aggregate payoff spells a gain for both individuals if the interaction 
between them is symmetric in that each has an equal chance to be in the position of a 
potential actor or receiver. Such a symmetric interaction is still non-strategic, since each 
player’s payoff is additively separable. Specifically, the payoff is the sum of a nonpositive 
term (cost) that is   or   , depending on the individual’s own decision of whether to act 
altruistically, and a nonnegative term (benefit) that is   or  , depending on the other 
individual’s decision; there is no interaction term. The game is thus a prisoner’s dilemma, 
specifically, the borderline case between strategic substitutability and complementarity 
mentioned at the end of Section ‎ 6.1.   
33 
8  Dynamic Stability and Comparative Statics 
The main finding of this paper is that negative comparative statics, whereby altruism 
paradoxically negatively affects the equilibrium social payoff, are unlikely if the equilibrium 
strategies involved are statically stable, that is, stable in the sense described in Section ‎ 4. 
A corollary of this finding is that, in groups or societies in which the dynamics of strategy 
choices tend to exclude statically unstable equilibrium strategies, so that dynamic stability 
implies static stability, altruism is only likely to make the group members better off. This 
result has particular relevance for groups that compete with each other, so that the effect of 
altruism on social welfare may affect the group’s probability of survival. In this case, the 
above finding suggests that altruism may be favored by group selection. Thus, dynamic 
stability, which refers to intragroup dynamics, may be consequential for intergroup 
dynamics.  
Whether or not dynamic stability implies static stability depends on the particular dynamics 
involved. This is illustrated by the case of symmetric       games, for which the notion of 
static stability considered in this paper coincides with evolutionary stability (Theorem 3). In 
an animal population in which such a game   is played between pairs of related individuals 
with the same coefficient of relatedness   (e.g., full siblings, with          ; see Section ‎ 2), 
the dynamics are governed by mutation and natural selection. A strategy may be considered 
dynamically stable if it is uninvadable in the (population genetics) sense that, if all members 
of the population adopt it, no mutant strategy can invade. An uninvadable strategy is 
necessarily an ESS in the corresponding modified game    (but not conversely; see Hines 
and Maynard Smith, 1979; Milchtaich, 2006). As explained above, this means that in games 
between relatives in nature, negative comparative statics are unlikely. That is, if in a 
different population the same game   is played between somewhat more closely related 
individuals (which means a higher  ), the outcome is likely to be either the same as or better 
than in the first population.  
An alternative notion of dynamic stability in symmetric       games, viewed as population 
games, which is weaker (rather than stronger) than the static notion of evolutionary 
stability, is asymptotic stability under the continuous-time replicator dynamics (Hofbauer 
and Sigmund, 1998). The replicator equation gives the rate of change of the coordinates of 
the population strategy     (           ), which (in the simple version considered below) 
describes the frequency of use of each pure strategy in the population. Specifically, for a 
game with a payoff matrix     (   ), the rate of change  ̇  (           ) depends on the 
difference between the expected payoff from using (the pure) strategy   and the mean 
payoff: 
 ̇       (∑     
 
   
  ∑        
 
     
)  
Asymptotic stability with respect to the replicator dynamics does not preclude negative 
comparative statics and instability does not preclude positive comparative statics. For 
example, in a generalized rock–scissors–paper game, the equilibrium strategy is globally 
asymptotically stable under the continuous-time replicator dynamics if and only if the  
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equilibrium payoff is positive (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, Theorem 7.7.2; Weissing, 1991, 
Theorem 5.6). In this case, the population converges to the equilibrium strategy from any 
initial interior point (i.e., a completely mixed population strategy). If the equilibrium payoff is 
negative, the equilibrium is unstable, and the population strategy converges to the boundary 
of the strategy space from any initial point other than the equilibrium strategy itself. For the 
left payoff matrix in (27), the equilibrium payoff in the modified game    is positive for all 
            , and for the right matrix, it is negative. Hence, in the former case the 
corresponding equilibrium strategy is stable under the replicator dynamics (as well as under 
other natural dynamics; see Chamberland and Cressman, 2000), and in the latter, it is 
unstable. However, as shown in Section ‎ 5.1, the personal payoff decreases with increasing 
altruism coefficient for the left payoff matrix in (27) and increases for the right matrix. This 
demonstrates the point made above: depending on the dynamics, the notion of static 
stability used in Theorems 1 and 2 may or may not be implied by dynamic stability. If the 
implication does not hold, then paradoxical, negative comparative statics are not necessarily 
unlikely.  
Appendix: Strong Stability 
A stable equilibrium strategy in a symmetric       game is normally also “strongly” stable in 
the sense that a continuous deformation of the payoff matrix changes the equilibrium 
strategy in a continuous manner. Specifically, the following proposition, which is essentially 
due to Selten (1983), shows that every regular ESS has this property. An ESS is said to be 
regular if its support includes every action that is a best response to it (equivalently, if the 
corresponding symmetric equilibrium is quasi-strict; see van Damme, 1991). The proposition 
has a corollary for local comparative statics; see Section ‎ 5.1.  
Proposition A.1. Let   be a regular ESS in a symmetric       game with a payoff matrix  . 
There is a neighborhood   of   in the strategy space and a neighborhood   of   in    
 such 
that: 
(i)  every symmetric       game   with a payoff matrix in   has a unique 
equilibrium strategy in  , 
(ii)  that strategy   is a regular ESS, its support is equal to that of  , and it is the only 
equilibrium strategy in   with that support, and  
(iii) the mapping from   to   thus defined is continuous.  
Proof. According to the regularity assumption, every action   that is not in the support of the 
ESS   (i.e.,       ) is not a best response to  . Therefore, there are neighborhoods    and    
of   and  , respectively, such that every action   as above is also not a best response to any 
strategy        in any symmetric       game with a payoff matrix       . If   is an 
equilibrium strategy for  , this means that its support is necessarily contained in that of  . 
Let        be a closed neighborhood of   that includes only strategies   whose support 
contains that of   (i.e.,        for every action   with       ).  
The regularity of   implies that it is an essential ESS (van Damme, 1991, Theorem 9.3.6). That 
is, every symmetric       game with a payoff matrix close to   has an ESS close to  . In  
35 
particular, there is a neighborhood        of   such that every symmetric       game with 
a payoff matrix       has some ESS      . As shown above, the support of   – indeed, of 
any equilibrium strategy for   lying in   – coincides with that of  . Since the support of an 
ESS cannot coincide with that of any other equilibrium strategy in the same game (van 
Damme, 1991, Lemma 9.2.4), conditions (i) and (ii) in the proposition hold. The mapping that 
assigns to each element of   the set of its equilibrium strategies in   is clearly upper 
semicontinuous. Since by (i) this mapping is singleton-valued, condition (iii) also holds.  ∎ 
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